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Abstract
In this paper, we suggest an algorithm for price adjustment towards a partial market
equilibrium. Its convergence properties are crucially based on Convex Analysis. Our
price adjustment corresponds to a subgradient scheme for minimizing a special nonsmooth
convex function. This function is the total excessive revenue of the market's participants
[16, 18], and its minimizers are equilibrium prices. As the main result, the algorithm
of price adjustment is shown to converge to equilibrium prices. Additionally, a market
equilibrium clears on average during the price adjustment process. This means that the
market clears by historical averages of supply and demand. Moreover, an ecient rate of
convergence is obtained. Additionally, we endow our algorithm with decentralized prices
by introducing the trade design. The latter suggests that producers settle and update
their individual prices, and consumers buy at the lowest purchase price. The proposed
price adjustment enjoys a natural behavioral interpretation. First, producers forecast
their individual prices to be proportional to their excess demands. For the price update,
they subsequently apply an average of these price forecasts over time.
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decentralization of prices, partial equilibrium, historical averaging
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1 Introduction
In microeconomics, partial equilibrium describes a state of a market where supply of goods
meets demand by an appropriate price. This market clearing or competitive price is often
referred to as equilibrium price. Naturally, the question arises on how the prices can be
adjusted in order to reach an equilibrium. In order to address this question, we study the
following price adjustment process:
Phase I, Production. Let producers face their individual prices of goods. They
maximize prots by computing the optimal production bundles. Additionally, pro-
ducers compare their prots with xed costs and decide whether to produce or not.
Phase II, Consumption. Consumers identify the lowest purchase prices of goods,
and minimize expenditures by computing the optimal consumption bundles. Then,
they compare their expenditures with wealths and decide whether to consume or
not. Finally, consumers decide on demands from those producers who oer lowest
purchase prices.
Phase III, Price update. Producers face their individual excess supplies, and
accumulate them over time. They set the price forecast being proportional to their
accumulated excess supplies. In order to obtain new individual prices, producers
combine their previous prices with forecasts.
In this paper, we show that the above algorithm of price adjustment successively
leads to a market equilibrium. Its convergence properties are crucially based on Convex
Analysis. The price adjustment corresponds to the quasi-monotone subgradent method
for nonsmooth convex minimization, recently suggested in [17]. As objective function for
the latter method we take the total excessive revenue of the market. Equilibrium prices
can be then characterized as its minimizers. Overall, we claim that our price adjustment
is reliable, computable, and decentralized.
Reliability refers to the fact that the price adjustment converges to a market equi-
librium on average. First, note that the prices in Phase III are formed by averaging of
price forecasts. This behavioral pattern accommodates the producers' experience during
the price evolvement. Secondly, the sequence of successful and failed production and con-
sumption attempts in Phases I and II denes the agents' individual history. On average,
this individual history provides production and consumption frequencies, which approach
the participation levels of producers and consumers in market activities over time [16, 18].
Thirdly, average production and consumption bundles implemented in Phases I and II
are shown to approximately clear the market. The latter means that during the price
adjustment supply meets demand statistically. In mathematical terms, frequencies and
average bundles approach the solution of the adjoint problem for the minimization of the
total excessive revenue.
Computability of price adjustment means that we can guarantee its rate of convergence.
In worst case, the number of price updates needed to achieve the "-tolerance is proportional
to 1
"2
. Note that this rate of convergence is optimal for nonsmooth convex minimization,
cf. [15]. From the economic perspective, this result explains why competitive markets
adjust in ecient way, moreover, it quanties the worst-case eciency.
Decentralization explains how market participants can successively update prices by
themselves rather than by relying on a central authority. In this article, the decentraliza-
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tion of prices is implemented by the trade design:
producers suggest and update their individual selling prices,
and consumers buy at the lowest prices observed at the market.
It is crucial for our approach that the introduction of the trade design preserves convexity
of the total excessive revenue. Moreover, its convex subgradients with respect to pro-
ducer's prices become the individual excess supplies, which are easily observable. This
advantage is used by producers in Phase III for computing the individual price forecasts.
We mention some literature related to our approach. The study of convex market
models has been initiated in [5]. Based on that, polynomial-time algorithms for equi-
librium pricing are studied in [1, 2, 3]. Recently, Convex Analysis was used to model
nancial equilibria, see [9]. Decentralization of prices via the trade design is suggested
already in [4]. There a disequilibrium price dynamics due to Hahn is considered, see
[7]. We refer to [8] for an overview on prices adjustment processes. We also mention
[13] where a simultaneous ascending auction is used to construct a decentralized price
adjustment. Starting with [21], the theory of bargaining has been successively applied for
market decentralization (see e.g. [6, 14]).
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the excessive revenue
model and introduce our concept of market equilibrium. In Section 3 we describe the
decentralization of prices. We prove convergence of the decentralized price adjustment
in Section 4. Appendix is devoted to the mathematical justication of quasi-monotone
subgradient schemes.
Notation. Our notation is quite standard. We denote by Rn the space of n-
dimensional column vectors x = (x(1); : : : ; x(n))T , and by Rn+ the set of all vectors with
nonnegative components. For x and y from Rn, we introduce the standard scalar product
and the Hadamard product
hx; yi =
nX
i=1
x(i)y(i); x  y =

x(i)y(i)
n
i=1
2 Rn:
Finally, (a)+ denotes the positive part of the real value a 2 R: (a)+ = maxfa; 0g. For
x = (x(1); : : : ; x(n))T 2 Rn we denote (x)+ =
 
(x(1))+; : : : ; (x
(n))+
T
.
2 Excessive revenue model
We present the excessive revenue model of a competitive market with multiple goods,
which has been introduced in [16] and extended in [18]. For that, we need to describe the
behavior of producers and consumers. Given prices of goods, they maximize their prots
and minimize their expenditures by deciding on tentative production and consumption
patterns. The latter must be compatible with their needs and technological constraints.
Additionally, producers compare their prots with xed costs, and consumers compare
their expenditures with available wealths. This comparison is needed to adjust real pro-
duction and consumption bundles accordingly. Then, we dene the equilibrium production
and consumption ows, which clear the market of goods by some equilibrium prices.
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2.1 Producers and consumers
Consider a market with K producers, which are able to produce n dierent goods. Given
a vector of prices p 2 Rn+, the k-th producer forms his supply operator Sk(p) of real
production bundles eyk 2 Rn+. For that, the k-th producer maximizes the prot with
respect to his variable cost, subsequently he tries to cover his xed cost. Namely,
 The k-th producer chooses rst the tentative production bundle yk 2 Rn+ by solving
the prot maximization problem:
k(p)
def
= max
yk2Yk
hp; yki   ck(yk): (1)
Here, Yk  Rn+ is the production set, assumed to be nonempty, compact and convex.
The producer's yield is hp; yki. The variable cost of producing yk is denoted by ck(yk).
We assume that ck is a convex function on Rn+. Clearly, the prot k(p) is convex
in p as the maximum of linear functions. By Yk(p) we denote the set of optimal
solutions of (1), i.e. yk 2 Yk(p). Note that the prot maximization problem (1)
appears already in Marshallian partial equilibrium analysis (see e.g. [12]).
 Secondly, the k-th producer compares his prot k(p) with his xed cost of main-
taining the technological set Yk, denoted by k  k(Yk) 2 R+. The latter can
include the interest paid to the bank, dierent charges for renting the equipment,
land use, etc. By this comparison, a participation level k  k(p) 2 [0; 1] of k-th
producer is properly adjusted:
k(p)
def
=

1; if k(p) > k;
0; if k(p) < k:
(2)
 Finally, the supply operator Sk : Rn+  Rn+ of the k-th producer is given by
Sk(p)
def
= feyk = kyk jk  k(p) and yk 2 Yk(p)g : (3)
Here, the real production bundles are
eyk def= kyk;
where k  k(p) is a proper participation level of the k-th producer, and yk 2 Yk(p)
is his tentative production.
Let I consumers be active at the market. The i-th consumer has to decide on his
real consumption bundle exi 2 Rn+. These real consumption bundles form his demand
Di(p), given the price p 2 Rn+. The i-th consumer minimizes the expenditure with an
aim to guarantee his desirable utility level. Then he tries to cover this expenditure by the
available wealth. Namely,
 The i-th producer decides rst on the tentative consumption bundle xi 2 Rn+ by
minimizing his expenditure:
ei(p)
def
= min
xi 2 Xi
ui(xi)  ui
hp; xii = min
xi 2 Xi
hp; xii ; (4)
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where the i-th consumption set is
Xi def= fxi 2 Xi jui(xi)  uig :
Here, Xi  Rn+ is assumed to be nonempty, compact and convex. By ui : Xi ! R+
we denote the utility function of the i-th consumer, assumed to be concave. The
utility level ui 2 R+ is desirable by i-th consumer. The consumer's expenditure ei(p)
is concave in p as the minimum of linear functions. By X i (p) we denote the set of
optimal solutions of (4), i.e. xi 2 X i (p). The minimization of expenditure in (4) is
well-known in economics as a dual problem for utility maximization. The desirable
utility level ui mainly reects the consumer's standards on qualities of goods. In
[20] the agent who faces the expenditure minimization problem (4) is called the dual
consumer. We also refer to [10, Chapter 10] and [11] for more details on the dual
theory of consumption.
 Secondly, the i-th consumer compares his expenditure ei(p) with his available wealth
wi 2 R+. The latter can include the budget, salary and rent payments, etc. By this
comparison, a participation level i  i(p) 2 [0; 1] of i-th consumer is properly
adjusted:
i(p)
def
=

1; if ei(p) < wi;
0; if ei(p) > wi:
(5)
 Finally, the demand operator Di : Rn+  Rn+ of the i-th consumer is given by
Di(p)
def
= fexi = ixi ji  i(p) and xi 2 X i (p)g : (6)
Here, the real consumption bundle are
exi def= ixi;
where i  i(p) is a proper participation level of the i-th consumer, and xi 2 X i (p)
is his tentative consumption.
2.2 Equilibrium market ows
In accordance to the previous notations, we eventually say that the real market ow
eF = (eyk = kyk)Kk=1 ; (exi = ixi)Ii=1
is dened by the triple (p; F; ). Here, p 2 Rn+ is the vector of prices,
F =

(yk)
K
k=1 ; (xi)
I
i=1

2
KY
k=1
Yk 
IY
i=1
Xi
is the tentative market ow, and
 =

(k)
K
k=1 ; (i)
I
i=1

2 [0; 1]K+I
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is the proper system of participation levels (w.r.t. p and F ), i.e.
k =

1; if hp; yki   ck(yk) > k;
0; if hp; yki   ck(yk) < k ; i =

1; if hp; xii < wi;
0; if hp; xii > wi:
Now we dene the market equilibrium in the standard way.
Denition 1 (Equilibrium market ow) We say that p 2 Rn is the equilibrium
price if there exists a real market ow
eF  = (eyk = kyk)Kk=1 ; (exi = i xi )Ii=1 2 KY
k=1
Sk(p
)
IY
i=1
Di(p
);
satisfying the market clearing condition
p  0;
KX
k=1
eyk   IX
i=1
exi  0;
*
p;
KX
k=1
eyk   IX
i=1
exi
+
= 0: (7)
In this case, eF  is called the equilibrium market ow.
The market clearing condition (7) states that the real consumption never exceed the
real production, and the markets of goods with positive prices (p(j) > 0) are perfectly
cleared:
KX
k=1
ey(j)k = IX
i=1
ex(j)i :
3 Decentralization of prices
3.1 Characterization of equilibrium prices
Given a vector of prices p 2 Rn+, producers maximize their prots and consumers min-
imize their expenditures. Afterwards, both properly adjust their participation levels by
comparing the prots with the xed costs, in case of producers, or by comparing the
expenditures with the wealths, in case of consumers. Exactly the same behavior can be
obtained by maximizing their excessive revenues.
The excessive revenue of the k-th producer is set as
ERPk(p)
def
= (k(p)  k)+ = max
yk 2 Yk
(hp; yki   ck(yk)  k)+ ; (8)
where
Xi def= fxi 2 Xi jui(xi)  uig :
Using the substitution eyk = kyk, we obtain
ERPk(p) = (k(p)  k)+ = max
k2[0;1]
k (k(p)  k) =
5
max
k 2 [0; 1]
yk 2 Yk
k (hp; yki   ck(yk)  k) = max
k 2 [0; 1]eyk 2 kYk
hp; eyki   kck (eyk=k)  kk:
Note that the maximization problem
ERPk(p) = max
k 2 [0; 1]eyk 2 kYk
hp; eyki   kck (eyk=k)  kk
is convex, and its set of optimal solutions consists of proper participation levels k and
real production bundles eyk. Moreover, ERPk(p) is convex in p as the maximum of linear
functions. Hence, the convex subdierential of the excessive revenue ERPk gives the
supply Sk of the k-th producer, i.e.
@ERPk(p) = Sk(p): (9)
The latter follows e.g. from [22, Theorem 2.4.18] on the convex subdierential of a max-
type function.
Analogously, we dene the excessive revenue of the i-th consumer as follows:
ERCi(p)
def
= (wi   ei(p))+ = max
xi 2 Xi
(wi   hp; xii)+ : (10)
Using the substitution exi = ixi, we obtain
ERCi(p) = (wi   ei(p))+ = max
i2[0;1]
i (wi   ei(p)) =
max
i 2 [0; 1]
xi 2 Xi
i (wi   hp; xii) = max
i 2 [0; 1]exi 2 iXi
iwi   hp; exii :
Note that exi 2 iXi means
exi 2 iXi and ui (exi=i)  ui:
In particular, iui (exi=i) is jointly concave in (exi; i). The maximization problem
ERCi(p) = max
i 2 [0; 1]exi 2 iXi
iwi   hp; exii
is convex, and its set of optimal solutions consists of proper participation levels i and
real consumption bundles exi. Moreover, ERCi(p) is convex in p as the maximum of
linear functions. Hence, the convex subdierential of the excessive revenue ERCi gives
the opposite demand Di of the i-th consumer, i.e.
@ERCi(p) =  Di(p): (11)
The latter follows also from [22, Theorem 2.4.18].
Overall, we dene the total excessive revenue as the sum of excessive revenues of all
agents:
TER(p)
def
=
KX
k=1
EPRk(p) +
IX
i=1
ECRi(p): (12)
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Note that function TER() is convex since it is a sum of convex functions. Moreover, its
convex subdierential represents the excess supply due to (9) and (11).
By application of [19, Theorem 23.8] on the subdierential of the sum of convex func-
tions, we obtain:
Theorem 1 (Excess supply and TER, [16, 18]) For p 2 Rn+ it holds:
@TER(p) =
KX
k=1
Sk(p) 
IX
i=1
Di(p):
Theorem 1 allows us to characterize equilibrium prices as minimizers of TER.
Theorem 2 (Characterization of equilibrium prices, [16, 18]) p 2 Rn+ is a system
of equilibrium prices if and only if it solves the following convex minimization problem:
min
p2Rn+
TER(p): (P)
3.2 Trade design
Theorem 2 reveals the origin of equilibrium prices at the market. Namely, in order to
reach an equilibrium price one needs to solve the minimization problem (P):
min
p2Rn+
TER(p):
Our goal is to explain how agents can eciently tackle this nonsmooth convex mini-
mization problem by successively updating prices. It is crucial for our approach that
the updates of prices correspond to subgradient-type schemes for solving (P). Due to
Theorem 1, the subgradients rTER(p) represent the excess supply, i.e.
rTER(p) =
KX
k=1
eyk   IX
i=1
exi; where eyk 2 Sk(p); exi 2 Di(p): (13)
This gives rise to use the subgradients z(p) for the iterative minimization of TER. E.g.,
the change of prices p can be taken proportional to the current excess demand:
p   rTER(p):
However, as it can be seen from (13), the subgradients of TER are not known to individual
agents. Indeed, z(p) represents the aggregate excess supply. For getting access to its value,
one would assume the existence of a manager who collects the information about agents'
production and consumption bundles, and aggregates them over the whole market. Here,
the full information about production and consumption over the market must be available
to him. Besides, the prices need to be updated by the manager, thus, leading to price
regulation. Clearly, these assumptions can be justied only within a centrally planned
economy. Aiming to avoid this restriction, we decentralize prices.
The decentralization of prices can be implemented by the introduction of various price
designs. In this paper, we focus just on the trade design:
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k-th producer settles and updates his individual prices pk,
and consumers buy at the lowest purchase price min
k=1;:::;K
pk.
Note that for vectors p1; : : : ; pK 2 Rn, we denote by min
k=1;:::;K
pk 2 Rn the vector with
coordinates 
min
k=1;:::;K
pk
(j)
= min
k=1;:::;K
p
(j)
k ; j = 1; : : : ;K:
Now, the total excessive revenue depends on the producers' prices (pk)
K
k=1 as follows:
TER(p1; : : : ; pK)
def
=
KX
k=1
EPRk (pk) +
IX
i=1
ECRi

min
k=1;:::;K
pk

=
KX
k=1
max
yk2Yk
(hp; yki   ck(yk))+ +
IX
i=1
max
xi2Xi

wi  

min
k=1;:::;K
pk; xi

+
: (14)
The decentralization of prices makes the corresponding subdierential information about
excess demands available to producers. In fact, note that the total excessive revenue TER
from (14) is convex in the variables (pk)
K
k=1. Let us obtain an expression for its convex
subgradients rpkTER(p1; : : : ; pK) w.r.t. pk:
rpkTER(p1; : : : ; pK) = eyk   IX
i=1
ik  exi; k = 1; : : : ;K: (15)
Here, eyk 2 Sk(pk) is the supply of k-th producer w.r.t. his individual price pk, andexi 2 Di min
k=1;:::;K
pk

is the demand of i-th consumer w.r.t. the lowest purchase price
min
k=1;:::;K
pk. Further, 
(j)
ik denotes the share of i-th consumer's demand from k-th producer
for good j. Indeed, the shares 
(j)
ik for good j sum up to 1 over all producers k = 1; : : : ;K.
Moreover, the share 
(j)
ik vanishes if the k-th producer's price p
(j)
k exceeds the lowest
purchase price min
k=1;:::;K
p
(j)
k for good j. Thus, we write
(ik)
K
k=1 2M (p1; : : : ; pK) ;
where
M (p1; : : : ; pK)
def
=
8>>>><>>>>:(k)
K
k=1 2 [0; 1]nK

KX
k=1

(j)
k = 1;

(j)
k = 0 if p
(j)
k 6= mink=1;:::;K p
(j)
k
j = 1; : : : ; n; k = 1; : : : ;K
9>>>>=>>>>; :
We claim that the subdierential information in (15) is known to k-th producer. First,
note that eyk is his real production. Despite of the fact that the shares ik and the
demands exi cannot be estimated by k-th producer, their aggregated productPIi=1 ik exi
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is perfectly available to him. Indeed,
PI
i=1 ik  exi forms the bundle of goods demanded
by all consumers from k-th producer. Altogether, the subgradients rpkTER(p1; : : : ; pK)
represent the individual excess of k-th producer's supply over all consumers' demands.
Overall, we obtain:
Theorem 3 (Producers' excess supply and TER)
@pkTER(p1; : : : ; pK) = Sk(pk) 
IX
i=1
ik Di

min
k=1;:::;K
pk

; k = 1; : : : ;K;
with demand shares (ik)
K
k=1 2M (p1; : : : ; pK) :
Due to Theorem 3, the subdierential of TER(p1; : : : ; pk) is completely available to
k-th producer. This fact suggests to adjust prices by solving the minimization problem
min
p1;:::;pK2Rn+
TER(p1; : : : ; pK): (PD)
Note that the minimization problem (PD) is stated w.r.t. the decentralized producers'
prices (pk)
K
k=1, while previously in (P) one minimizes over the common prices p.
3.3 Adjoint problem
We relate the minimization problems (P) and (PD) by exploiting the fact that they have
the same adjoint problem. In order to state the adjoint problem for (P) and (PD), we
set

def
= fkgKk=1 ; ey def= feykgKk=1 ;  def= figIi=1 ; ex def= fexigIi=1 ;
Y def=
KY
k=1
Yk; Y def=
KY
k=1
kYk;X def=
IY
i=1
Xi; X def=
IY
i=1
iXi:
Here, ,  represent participation levels, and ey, ex represent real production and con-
sumption bundles, respectively. Moreover, Y, X represent real production and real
consumption sets given the participation levels , , respectively.
The feasible set of the adjoint problem is formed by participation levels and corre-
sponding real production and consumption bundles, i.e.
A def=

(; ey; ; ex)  (; ey) 2 [0; 1]K  Y(; ex) 2 [0; 1]I  X

:
Note that the set A is convex. Further, the following adjoint constraint need to be satised:
KX
k=1
eyk  IX
i=1
exi; (16)
meaning that the aggregate real consumption does not exceed the aggregate real produc-
tion. The objective function of the adjoint problem is
 (; ey; ; ex) def= IX
i=1
iwi  
KX
k=1
kck (eyk=k) + kk;
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expressing the dierence between the aggregate wealth spent for real consumption and
producers' costs. Finally, we consider the maximization problem
max
(; ey; ; ex) 2 A
(
(; ey; ; ex) 
KX
k=1
eyk  IX
i=1
exi
)
: (A)
It turns out that (A) is the adjoint problem for (P) and (PD). The proof of this fact
uses the following simple Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 For yk; x 2 Rn+, k = 1; : : : ;K, the inequality
KX
k=1
yk  x (17)
is equivalent to
KX
k=1
hpk; yki 

min
k=1;:::;K
pk; x

for all pk 2 Rn+; k = 1; : : : ;K: (18)
Proof:
(i) Let (17) be satised. For pk 2 Rn+, k = 1; : : : ;K, we have
KX
k=1
hpk; yki  

min
k=1;:::;K
pk; x

=
nX
j=1
 
KX
k=1
p
(j)
k y
(j)
k   mink=1;:::;K p
(j)
k x
(j)
!
:
For (18) to hold, it is sucient to show that
KX
k=1
p
(j)
k y
(j)
k   mink=1;:::;K p
(j)
k x
(j)  0 for all j = 1; : : : ; n:
Indeed, setting for xed j 2 f1; : : : ; ng
p(j) = min
k=1;:::;K
p
(j)
k and K(j) =
n
k 2 f1; : : : ;Kg
 p(j)k = p(j)o ; (19)
we obtain:
KX
k=1
p
(j)
k y
(j)
k   mink=1;:::;K p
(j)
k x
(j) =
X
k2K(j)
p(j)y
(j)
k +
X
k 62K(j)
p
(j)
k y
(j)
k   p(j)x(j) =
=
X
k2K(j)
p(j)y
(j)
k +
X
k 62K(j)
p
(j)
k y
(j)
k   p(j)x(j) +
X
k 62K(j)
p(j)y
(j)
k  
X
k 62K(j)
p(j)y
(j)
k
= p(j)
 
KX
k=1
y
(j)
k   x(j)
!
+
X
k 62K(j)

p
(j)
k   p(j)

y
(j)
k :
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The last expression is nonnegative due to (17), (19), and p(j); y
(j)
k 2 R+, k = 1; : : : ;K.
(ii) Let (18) be satised. Setting there pk = p 2 Rn+, we get*
p;
KX
k=1
xk
+
 hp; yi for all p 2 Rn+:
Hence, (17) is fullled. 2
Theorem 4 It holds:
min
p2Rn+
TER(p) = min
p1;:::;pK2Rn+
TER(p1; : : : ; pK)
= max
(; ey; ; ex) 2 A
(
(; ey; ; ex) 
KX
k=1
eyk  IX
i=1
exi
)
:
Proof:
TER(p1; : : : ; pK) =
KX
k=1
max
yk2Yk
(hp; yki   ck(yk)  k)++
IX
i=1
max
xi2Xi

wi  

min
k=1;:::;K
pk; xi

+
=
KX
k=1
max
k2[0;1]
yk2Yk
k (hp; yki   ck(yk)  k) +
IX
i=1
max
i2[0;1]
xi2Xi
i

wi  

min
k=1;:::;K
pk; xi

= max
(;y)2[0;1]KY
(;x)2[0;1]IX
KX
k=1
k (hp; yki   ck(yk)  k) +
IX
i=1
i

wi  

min
k=1;:::;K
pk; xi

= max
(;ey)2[0;1]KY
(;ex)2[0;1]IX
KX
k=1
(hp; eyki   kck (eyk=k)  kk) + IX
i=1

iwi  

min
k=1;:::;K
pk; exi
= max
(;ey;;ex)2A (; ey; ; ex) +
KX
k=1
hpk; eyki  
*
min
k=1;:::;K
pk;
IX
i=1
exi+ : (20)
Using this representation of TER(p1; : : : ; pK), we obtain:
min
p1;:::;pK2Rn+
TER(p1; : : : ; pK) =
= min
p1;:::;pK2Rn+
max
(;ey;;ex)2A (; ey; ; ex) +
KX
k=1
hpk; eyki  
*
min
k=1;:::;K
pk;
IX
i=1
exi+
= max
(;ey;;ex)2A  (; ey; ; ex) + minp1;:::;pK2Rn+
KX
k=1
hpk; eyki  
*
min
k=1;:::;K
pk;
IX
i=1
exi+ (21)
11
= max
(;ey;;ex)2A
8><>:(; ey; ; ex)

KX
k=1
hpk; eyki 
*
min
k=1;:::;K
pk;
IX
i=1
exi+
for all pk 2 Rn+; k = 1; : : : ;K
9>=>; :
Applying Lemma 1, the adjoint constraint (16) is equivalent to
KX
k=1
hpk; eyki 
*
min
k=1;:::;K
pk;
IX
i=1
exi+ for all pk 2 Rn+; k = 1; : : : ;K:
Overall, (A) is the adjoint problem for (PD).
Analogously, (A) is the adjoint problem for (P). Instead of Lemma 1, one uses here
the equivalence of (16) to*
p;
KX
k=1
eyk
+

*
p;
IX
i=1
exi+ for all p 2 Rn+:
2
Corollary 1 Let (pk)
K
k=1 solve (PD) and (; ey; ; ex) solve its adjoint problem (A). Then,
the lowest purchase prices min
k=1;:::;K
pk form equilibrium prices with the proper system of
participation levels  = (; ) and the corresponding equilibrium market ow eF = (ey; ex).
Moreover, the k-th producer's real production bundle ey(j)k vanishes if his individual price
p
(j)
k exceeds the lowest purchase price mink=1;:::;K
p
(j)
k for good j, i.e.
ey(j)k = 0 if p(j)k 6= mink=1;:::;K p(j)k ; k = 1; : : : ;K; j = 1; : : : ; n:
Proof:
Due to Theorem 4:
0  TER

min
k=1;:::;K
pk

  (; ey; ; ex) (14) TER (p1; : : : ; pK)  (; ey; ; ex) = 0:
Hence, min
k=1;:::;K
pk solves (P). By Theorem 2, min
k=1;:::;K
pk forms the system of equilibrium
prices. Moreover, its proper system of participation levels is (; ) and the corresponding
equilibrium market ow is (ey; ex). The latter follows from the fact that (A) is the adjoint
problem for (P).
Further, (21) from Theorem 4 yields
KX
k=1
hpk; eyki  
*
min
k=1;:::;K
pk;
IX
i=1
exi+ = KX
k=1

min
k=1;:::;K
pk; eyk 
*
min
k=1;:::;K
pk;
IX
i=1
exi+ = 0:
Thus,
KX
k=1

pk   min
k=1;:::;K
pk; eyk = 0;
12
or, equivalently,
p
(j)
k   mink=1;:::;K p
(j)
k ; ey(j)k  = 0; k = 1; : : : ;K; j = 1; : : : ; n:
The latter implies: ey(j)k = 0 if pjk 6= mink=1;:::;K p(j)k . 2
4 Price adjustment
We describe how producers may eciently adjust their individual prices (pk)
K
k=1 to ar-
rive at a system of equilibrium prices. This price adjustment corresponds to the quasi-
monotone subgradient method (SM) [17], which is described in Appendix for reader's
convenience. It is applied to the minimization of the total excessive revenue (PD):
min
p1;:::;pK2Rn+
TER(p1; : : : ; pK):
Let k-th producer choose a sequence of positive sensitivity parameters fk[t]gt0, k =
1; : : : ;K. We consider the following iteration:
Price Adjustment (PA)
1. Producers determine their current excess supplies rpkTER(p1[t]; : : : ; pK [t]):
a) k-th producer computes optimal tentative production bundles
yk(pk[t]) 2 Yk(pk[t]);
and participation level
k(pk[t]) =

1; if k(pk[t])  k;
0; if k(pk[t]) < k;
indicating whether yk(pk[t]) is worth to be implemented.
His real production bundle is k(pk[t])yk(pk[t]), i.e. either yk(pk[t]) or zero.
b) i-th consumer identies the lowest purchase prices
p[t] = min
k=1;:::;K
pk[t]:
He computes optimal tentative consumption bundle
xi(p[t]) 2 X i (p[t]);
and participation level
i(p[t]) =

1; if ei(p[t])  wi;
0; if ei(p[t]) < wi;
indicating whether xi(p[t]) is implemented.
His real consumption bundle is i(p[t])xi(p[t]), i.e. either xi(p[t]) or zero.
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c) i-th consumer decides on demand shares
(ik[t])
K
k=1 2M (p1[t]; : : : ; pK [t]) ;
and demands from k-th producer the consumption bundle
ik[t]  i(p[t])xi(p[t]); k = 1; : : : ;K:
d) k-th producer computes his current excess supply
rpkTER(p1[t]; : : : ; pK [t]) = k(pk[t])yk(pk[t]) 
IX
i=1
ik[t]i(p[t])xi(p[t]): (22)
2. k-th producer accumulates his excess supplies
zk[t] = zk[t  1] +rpkTER(p1[t]; : : : ; pK [t]); zk[ 1] = 0: (23)
3. k-th producer computes the price forecast w.r.t. his sensitivity parameter k[t]
p+k [t] =
1
k[t]
( zk[t])+ : (24)
4. k-th producer updates
pk[t+ 1] =
t+ 1
t+ 2
pk[t] +
1
t+ 2
p+k [t] (25)
by combining his previous price with his forecast. 2
4.1 Price forecast and price update
First, we give an interpretation for the price forecast (24). Recall that zk[t] represents the
excess of k-th producer's supply over consumers' demands for good j accumulated up to
time t. If z
(j)
k [t]  0, i.e. supply exceeds demand, then p+(j)k [t] = 0 for good j. In case of
z
(j)
k [t] < 0, the price forecast p
+(j)
k [t] is proportional to the accumulated individual excess
demand of k-th producer. Here, k[t] plays the role of a sensitivity parameter.
The price forecast (24) can be obtained within the Euclidean setup as follows. Let us
denote the Euclidean prox-function for Rn+ and the corresponding Bregman distance as as
d(p) =
1
2
nX
j=1

p(j)
2
; B(p; p) =
1
2
nX
j=1

p(j)   p(j)
2
:
For z 2 Rn;  > 0 we consider the auxiliary minimization problem
min
p2Rn+
fhz; pi+ d(p)g =   1
2
nX
j=1

 z(j)
2
+
: (26)
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Its unique solution is p+ =
1

( z)+ : The price forecast (24) reads then:
p+k [t] = arg minp2Rn+
fhzk[t]; pi+ k[t]d(p)g : (27)
Secondly, let us interpret the price update (25):
pk[t+ 1] =
t+ 1
t+ 2
pk[t] +
1
t+ 2
p+k [t]:
Due to the latter, the next price is a convex combination of the previous price and the
price forecast. With time advancing, the proportion of the previous price becomes nearly
one, but the fraction of the forecast vanishes. Hence, we conclude that our price update
corresponds to a behavior of an experienced producer. He credits his experience much
more than the current forecast. Further, from (25) we have
pk[t+ 1] =
1
t+ 2
 
pk[0] +
tX
r=0
p+k [r]
!
: (28)
The latter means that the prices generated by (PA) can be viewed as historical averages of
preceding forecasts. This averaging pattern is also quite natural to assume for producer's
behavior while adjusting prices.
4.2 Adjoint averaging
Our goal is to produce a feasible sequence for the adjoint problem (A) by averaging
participation levels, real production and consumption bundles from (PA). Along with the
prices f(p1[t]; : : : ; pK [t])gt0 generated by method (PA), we consider the corresponding
historical averages of participation levels:
k[t]
def
=
1
t+ 1
tX
r=0
k(pk[r]); i[t]
def
=
1
t+ 1
tX
r=0
i(p[r]):
Note that k[t] 2 [0; 1] is the frequency of successful production attempts by k-th producer
up to time t. Analogously, i[t] 2 [0; 1] is the frequency of successful consumption attempts
by i-th consumer up to time t. We denote by
[t] = ([t]; [t])
def
=

fk[t]gKk=1 ; fi[t]gIi=1

the system of average participation levels. The historical averages of real production and
consumption bundles are dened as follows:
eyk[t] def= 1
t+ 1
tX
r=0
k(pk[r])yk(pk[r]); exi[t] def= 1
t+ 1
tX
r=0
i(p[r])xi(p[r]):
Due to convexity, eyk[t] 2 k[t]Yk and exi[t] 2 i[t]Xi. We denote by
eF [t] = (ey[t]; ex[t]) def= feyk[t]gKk=1 ; fexi[t]gIi=1
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the average real market ow. Overall, the sequence
([t]; ey[t]; [t]; ex[t]) 2 A; t  0;
is feasible for the adjoint problem (A).
Next Lemma 2 estimates the dual gap for the minimization problem (PD) and its
adjoint problem (A) evaluated at the historical averages. For that, we set
Ht(z)
def
=   min
p2Rn+
(
hp; zi+ 1
t+ 1
KX
k=1
k[t]d(p)
)
; z 2 Rn;
Rt
def
=  
KX
k=0
tX
r=0
min
p2Rn+
 
rpkTER(p1[r]; : : : ; pK [r]); p  p+k [r   1]
+k[r   1]Bd
 
p; p+k [r   1]
  :
Lemma 2 Let the sequence fp1[t]; : : : ; pK [t]gt0 be generated by (PA) with nondecreasing
parameters
k[t+ 1]  k[t]; t  0; k = 1; : : : ;K:
Then, for all t  0 it holds:
TER(p1[t]; : : : ; pK [t])   ([t]; ey[t]; [t]; ex[t]) +Ht KX
k=1
eyk[t]  IX
i=1
exi[t]!  Rt
t+ 1
: (29)
Proof:
It follows from (20) that the total excessive revenue is representable as a maximum of
concave functions:
TER(p1; : : : ; pK) = max
(;ey;;ex)2A (; ey; ; ex) + ' (p1; : : : ; pK ; ey; ex) ;
where
' (p1; : : : ; pK ; ey; ex) def= KX
k=1
hpk; eyki  
*
min
k=1;:::;K
pk;
IX
i=1
exi+ :
Hence, we apply Theorem 6 and Lemma 5 from Appendix to get the following inequality:
TER(p1[t]; : : : ; pK [t])  ([t]; ey[t]; [t]; ex[t])
  min
p1;:::;pK2Rn+
(
' (p1; : : : ; pK ; ey[t]; ex[t]) + 1
t+ 1
KX
k=1
k[t]d(pk)
)
 Rt
t+ 1
; t  0: (30)
We estimate
min
p1;:::;pK2Rn+
(
' (p1; : : : ; pK ; ey[t]; ex[t]) + 1
t+ 1
KX
k=1
k[t]d(pk)
)
 min
p2Rn+
(
' (p; : : : ; p; ey[t]; ex[t]) + 1
t+ 1
KX
k=1
k[t]d(p)
)
= min
p2Rn+
(*
p;
KX
k=1
eyk[t]  IX
i=1
exi[t]++ 1
t+ 1
KX
k=1
k[t]d(p)
)
Altogether, (30) implies (29). 2
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4.3 Convergence properties of (PA)
In order to arrive at the equilibrium price, producers need to appropriately adjust their
sensitivity parameters fk[t]gt0, k = 1; : : : ;K. In this Section we identify successful
adjustment strategies of sensitivity parameters. Aiming at estimating the remainder
term Rt from Lemma 2, we note that the sequence of k-th producer's excess supplies
frpkTER(p1[t]; : : : ; pK [t])gt0 is bounded w.r.t. Euclidean norm, i.e.
krpkTER(p1[t]; : : : ; pK [t])k  L; t  0; k = 1; : : : ;K: (31)
The existence of the constant L > 0 in (31) follows from the compactness of production
sets Yk, k = 1; : : : ;K, and consumption sets Xi, i = 1; : : : ; I (see Section 2).
We estimate the penalty term Ht and the remainder term Rt from Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 It holds for t  0:
(i) Ht(z) =
t+ 1
2
PK
k=1 k[t]
nX
j=1

 z(j)
2
+
; z 2 Rn,
(ii) Rt  L
2
2
KX
k=1
tX
r=0
1
k[r   1] .
Proof:
(i) follows immediately from (26).
(ii) For g 2 Rn; p+ 2 Rn+;  > 0 we estimate
min
p2Rn+


g; p  p++ Bd  p; p+	 
min
p2Rn


g; p  p++ Bdk  p; p+	 =   12
nX
j=1

g(j)
2
:
Using the latter inequality, we get:
Rt 
KX
k=1
tX
r=0
1
2k[r   1]
nX
j=1

r(j)pk TER(p1[r]; : : : ; pK [r])
2
:
Due to (31), it follows:
Rt 
KX
k=1
tX
r=0
L2
2k[r   1] :
2
Next Lemma 4 claries the appropriate choice of producers' sensitivity parameters
fk[t]gt0, k = 1; : : : ;K. The indicator function of Rn+ is denoted by
(z)
def
=

0; if z 2 Rn+;
1; else:
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Lemma 4 Let producers apply in (PA) sensitivity parameters satisfying
k[t]
t+ 1
! 0; k[t]p
t
!1; k = 1; : : : ;K:
Then,
Ht()! (); and Rt
t+ 1
! 0:
Moreover, the achievable order of convergence is O

1p
t

.
Proof:
If z 2 Rn+, then Ht(z) = 0. Otherwise, H1t (z) ! 1 as t+1PK
k k[t]
! 1. Here, the order of
convergence is
PK
k=1 k[t]
t+1 .
Due to k[t]p
t
!1, there exists T > 0 such that
k[t] 
p
t; t  T; k = 1; : : : ;K:
Using Lemma 3 we obtain:
Rt
t+ 1
 L
2
2
KX
k=1
"
1
t+ 1
TX
r=0
1
k[r   1] +
1
t+ 1
tX
r=T
1p
r
#
:
Immediately, we see that 1t+1
TX
r=0
1
k[r   1] ! 0. Note that for a convex univariate function
(r), r 2 R, and integer bounds a; b, we have
bX
r=a
(r) 
b+1=2Z
a 1=2
(s)ds: (32)
Hence, we also have
1
t+ 1
tX
r=T
1p
r
(32)
 1
t+ 1
t+1=2Z
T 1=2
1p
s
ds
=
2
t+ 1
p
s
t+1=2
T 1=2
=
2
t+ 1
p
t+ 1=2 
p
T   1=2

! 0:
Here, the order of convergence is O

1p
t

.
Overall, the order of convergence is
max
(PK
k=1 k[t]
t+ 1
; O

1p
t
)
: (33)
Choosing k[t] = O(
p
t), k = 1; : : : ;K, we achieve O

1p
t

in (33). 2
Now, we are ready to prove the main convergence result for (PA) in Euclidean setup.
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Theorem 5 Let producers apply in (PA) sensitivity parameters satisfying
k[t]
t+ 1
! 0; k[t]p
t
!1; k = 1; : : : ;K:
Then, the sequence (pk[t])
K
k=1 converge to an equilibrium price. Moreover, the correspond-
ing proper system of participation levels is approached by the system of average participa-
tion levels [t] = ([t]; [t]). The corresponding equilibrium market ow is approached by
the average real market ow eF [t] = (ey[t]; ex[t]). The achievable rate of convergence is of
the order O

1p
t

.
Proof:
From Lemma 2 we obtain:
TER(p1[t]; : : : ; pK [t])   ([t]; ey[t]; [t]; ex[t]) +Ht KX
k=1
eyk[t]  IX
i=1
exi[t]!  Rt
t+ 1
: (34)
The left-hand side of this inequality is composed by the objective function TER of the
primal problem (PD), computed at the current prices (p1[t]; : : : ; pK [t]), objective function
 of its adjoint problem (A), computed at historical averages ([t]; ey[t]; [t]; ex[t]), and the
quadratic penalty Ht for violation of the adjiont constraint:
KX
k=1
eyk[t]  IX
i=1
exi[t]; k = 1; : : : ;K:
Due to the choice of sensitivity parameters k[t], k = 1; : : : ;K, Lemma 4 provides:
Ht()! (); and Rt
t+ 1
! 0:
Hence, (pk[t])
K
k=1 converges towards a solution of (PD), and ([t]; ey[t]; [t]; ex[t]) converges
towards a solution of (A) by order O

1p
t

. Finally, we apply Corollary 1 to obtain the
assertion. 2
Now, we turn our attention to the case of constant sensitivity parameters.
Remark 1 Let producers apply in (PA) constant sensitivity parameters. Let " > 0 denote
the tolerance for convergence of (pk[t])
K
k=1 towards a solution of the primal problem (PD),
and ([t]; ey[t]; [t]; ex[t]) towards a solution of its adjoint problem (A). Our goal is to
indicate the number of steps t(") and the sensitivity parameters k("), k = 1 : : : ;K, in
order to guarantee the tolerance " for this primal-adjoint process. For that, we apply
constant sensitivity parameters k[t] = k, k = 1 : : : ;K to obtain
Ht(z) =
t+ 1
2
PK
k=1 k
nX
j=1

 z(j)
2
+
;
Rt
t+ 1
 L
2
2
KX
k=1
1
k
:
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Recalling (34), the order of convergence for the primal-adjoint process is
max
(PK
k=1 k
t+ 1
;
KX
k=1
1
k
)
:
Choosing
t(") = O

1
"2

; k(") = O

1
"

; k = 1; : : : ;K;
we have
max
(PK
k=1 k(")
t(") + 1
;
KX
k=1
1
k(")
)
= O("):
2
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Appendix
Quasi-monotone subgradient methods
Following the approach from [17], we present a quasi-monotone subgradient method for
nonsmooth convex minimization. We consider the following minimization problem:
min
x2X
f(x); (35)
where X  Rn is a closed convex set with nonempty interior intX, and f is a convex
function on Rn.
For function f , we denote by rf(x) its arbitrary subgradient at x 2 X:
f(y)  f(x) + hrf(x); y   xi; y 2 X: (36)
For the set X, we assume to be known a prox-function d(x).
Denition 2 d : X 7! R is called a prox-function for X w.r.t. Y  X if the following
holds:
21
 d(x)  0 for all x 2 X and d(x[0]) = 0 for certain x[0] 2 Y ;
 d is continuously dierentiable on Y and convex on X;
 Auxiliary minimization problem
min
x2X
fhz; xi+ d(x)g (37)
is easily solvable for z 2 Rn;  > 0, and admits the unique minimizer x(z; ) 2 Y .
Given a prox-function d, we dene the corresponding Bregman distance
Bd(x; y)
def
= d(x)  d(y)  hx  y;rd(y)i for x 2 X; y 2 Y: (38)
Due to convexity of d on X, Bd(x; y)  0. Moreover, for x 2 X it holds:
d(x) = d(x[0]) + hx  x[0];rd(x[0])i+Bd(x; x[0])  Bd(x; x[0]): (39)
For a sequence of positive parameters f[t]gt0, we consider the following iteration:
Quasi-monotone Subgradient Method
1. Take a current subgradient rf(x[t]).
2. Accumulate subgradients z[t] = z[t  1] +rf(x[t]), z[ 1] = 0.
3. Compute the forecast x+[t] = argmin
x2X
fhz[t]; xi+ [t]d(x)g.
4. Update by combining x[t+ 1] =
t+ 1
t+ 2
x[t] +
1
t+ 2
x+[t].
(SM)
Note that from (SM) we have
z[t] =
tX
r=0
rf(x[r]); x[t+ 1] = 1
t+ 2
 
x[0] +
tX
r=0
x+[r]
!
:
Further, we set for t  0:
`t(x)
def
=
tX
r=0
f(x[r]) + hrf(x[r]); x  x[r]i ;
 t
def
= min
x2X
f`t(x) + [t]d(x)g ;
Rt
def
=  
tX
r=0
min
x2X

rf(x[r]); x  x+[r   1]+ [r   1]Bd  x; x+[r   1]	 ;
where x+[ 1] = x[0]; [ 1] = [0].
Next result is crucial for the convergence analysis of the quasi-monotone subgradient
method. It is motivated by the estimate sequence technique (e.g., Section 2.2.1 in [15]).
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Theorem 6 Let the sequence fx[t]gt0 be generated by (SM) with nondecreasing param-
eters
[t+ 1]  [t]; t  0: (40)
Then, for all t  0 it holds:
f(x[t])   

t
t+ 1
 Rt
t+ 1
: (41)
Proof:
Let us assume that condition (41) is valid for some t  0. Then,
 t+1 = min
x2X
f`t(x) + f(xt+1) + hrf(x[t+ 1]); x  x[t+ 1]i+ [t+ 1]d(x)g
(40)
 min
x2X
f`t(x) + [t]d(x) + f(x[t+ 1]) + hrf(x[t+ 1]); x  x[t+ 1]ig
(38)
 min
x2X

 t + [t]Bd
 
x; x+[t]

+ f(x[t+ 1]) + hrf(x[t+ 1]); x  x[t+ 1]i	
(41)
 min
x2X

(t+ 1)f(x[t]) Rt
+[t]Bd (x; x
+[t]) + f(x[t+ 1]) + hrf(x[t+ 1]); x  x[t+ 1]i

(36)
 min
x2X

(t+ 1) [f(x[t+ 1]) + hrf(x[t+ 1]); x[t]  x[t+ 1]i] Rt
+[t]Bd (x; x
+[t]) + f(xt+1) + hrf(x[t+ 1]); x  x[t+ 1]i

:
Since (t+ 2)x[t+ 1] = (t+ 1)x[t] + x+[t], we obtain
 t+1  (t+ 2)f(x[t+ 1]) Rt +min
x2X

rf(x[t+ 1]); x  x+[t]+ [t]Bd  x; x+[t]	
= (t+ 2)f(x[t+ 1]) Rt+1:
It remains to note that
 0 = min
x2X
ff(x[0]) + hrf(x[0]); x  x[0]i+ [0]d(x)g
(39)
 f(x[0]) R0:
2
We relate the term
 t
t+1 from (41) to the adjoint problem for (35). For that, let f be
representable as a maximum of concave functions, i.e.
f(x) = max
a2A
(a) + '(x; a); (42)
where A  Rn is a closed convex set, '(; a), a 2 A, is a convex function on Rn, and ,
'(x; ), x 2 X, are concave functions on Rm.
Denote by a(x) one of the optimal solutions of the maximization problem in (42).
Then,
rf(x) def= rx'(x; a(x)) (43)
is a subgradient of f at x. Using the representation (42), we also have:
min
x2X
f(x) = min
x2X
max
a2A
(a) + '(x; a) = max
a2A
(a) + min
x2X
'(x; a):
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The latter maximization problem
max
a2A
(a) + min
x2X
'(x; a) (44)
is called adjoint for (35) with the adjoint state a 2 A.
Further, we dene the average adjoint state
a[t]
def
=
1
t+ 1
tX
r=0
a(x[r]); t  0:
Note that a[t] 2 A, since A is convex.
Lemma 5 Let f be representable as a maximum of concave functions according to (42).
Let the sequence fx[t]gt0 be generated by (SM) using subgradients of f from (43). Then,
 t
t+ 1
 (a[t]) + min
x2X

'(x; a[t]) +
[t]
t+ 1
d(x)

; t  0:
Proof:
It holds due to convexity of '(; a), a 2 A:
f(x[r]) + hrf(x[r]); x  x[r]i =
(42);(43)
= (a(x[r])) + ' (x[r]; a(x[r]) + hrx' (x[r]; a(x[r])) ; x  x[r]i
 (a(x[r]) + ' (x; a(x[r])) :
Hence, we obtain due to concavity of  and '(x; ), x 2 X:
`t(x) =
tX
r=0
f(x[r]) + hrf(x[r]); x  x[r]i

tX
r=0
(a(x[r]) + ' (x; a(x[r]))  (t+ 1) [ (a[t]) + ' (x; a[t]))] :
Finally, we get
 t = min
x2X
f`t(x) + [t]d(x)g  (t+ 1)

(a[t]) + min
x2X

' (x; a[t])) +
[t]
t+ 1
d(x)

:
2
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